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I am arguing that the human person, as the human identity from conception 
to death, links death with the beginnings of life and vice versa. This 
challenges us to identify the human person as one in a unitary development, 
physical and spiritual, that is sundered only at death. In approaching the 
matter from this angle I bring into focus the problem of identifying what 
happens at death and the problem of identifying what happens at the " 
beginning of personal life. This requires seeing through our psychological 
states to discover the necessary substratum that actually is the human 
person. 
At the outset, death is taken as the demarcation between the "process 
of dying and disintegration" (1 Garcia, 37). Death occurs with the 
irreversible loss of consciousness states, arousal and awareness, together 
with the loss of critical neurological function. This loss signals 
"inseparably and inherently, the cessation of the organism as a 
whole"(lbid.). The exact moment of death might possibly be recognizable ~ 
within technical limitations but even then as post factum (Bernat, 16). I 
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However, it is important that this elusive exactitude be recognized as a 
necessary reference point. 
Critical for philosophical consideration are the areas of the brain that 
are vitally necessary for ongoing life (Veatch, 19). This corresponds to the 
holistic human being functioning with the coherence of the "neural basis of 
consciousness"( I Garcia, 35). Consciousness and this specific neurological 
substratum are inseparable for living and life support. This concerns the 
integral functioning for life within and also external to the brain (Garcia, 
37). 
It seems quite an obvious matter to know when someone is dead, at 
least in our usual understanding as is commonly stated when people do say 
someone has passed away. Someone has left us. When we are conceived 
and begin to live and grow is a more mysterious event simply because it is 
invisible to the naked eye. Nevertheless, we do, in retrospect, sp~ak of 
when we were conceived and trust that our parents enjoyed the experience 
and love us yet. 
Parents, especially mothers, are much more likely to pinpoint the 
moment of a new life beginning within them, though some spiritually 
sensitive fathers may well share this as well. Such spiritual communication 
is an arousal in life akin to a wakefulness from non-existence. It should not 
surprise us to find that some people are more sensitive spirits than others. 
We are very familiar with the gracefulness and power of the synchronized 
body of an Olympic athlete and can contrast this with the more usual 
physical specimens of humanity. We also recognize great souls, such as the 
late Mother Teresa of Calcutta, simply as being great. Just as great athletes 
must practice and train, and great souls must self-direct their attention for 
their gifts to flourish , so too the spirit responds to fine-tuning in its 
communicating ways. 
The very word "spirit" signifies for Aquinas, a "power of the 
soul"(ST.I a. 79.13). ,For my purposes, spirit will be considered as the 
human self, communicating invisibly, as distinct from the human self being 
responsible. The spiritual heart or operating soul bears the responsibility of 
governing our spiritual lives. This it does through its rational will and its 
free choosing. Fulton Sheen considered spirit as the capacity for God. This 
then would indicate our spiritual capacity for other, lesser spirits, as well 
(Sheen, Retreat). I will use Spiritual Heart or simply heart, and soul or 
operating soul, synonymously throughout. The spirit is defined as the self, 
communicating invisibly. 
More will have to be said about our beginnings. At first, though, I will 
open up the end of life. This should make the problems more clear as to the 
make-up of a human being viewed from the end of life. This, in turn, will 
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incline the discussion to the beginnings of life so that both the beginning 
and the end will throw light on the human constitution, even its destiny. 
Considering Death: 
In our technological age of Intensive Care treatments, and especially 
the need for organs for transplant, when we are actually dead is a matter of 
considerable importance. Robert Veatch wonders why the problem of a 
criterion for death, in terms of death of the brain, has been so long debated. 
The modem technological aids to determine when death has occurred were 
expected to be conclusive and provide an easy and obvious answer. He 
finds the ongoing debate, however, centered on who is a moral person 
enjoying equal status with all others that constitute the "human moral 
community" (Veatch, 24). The debate has produced sharp divisions. Veatch 
recommends a conscience clause in law to protect people who have 
religious, cultural or even ethnic convictions concerning the death event in 
their own case (Veatch, 21-22). Being precise about the actual death of a 
donor may not be a restraint on some operators. Organs could be removed 
prematurely, even tragically. 
Bernat, in the face of Veatch ' s persistent criticism of the Whole Brain 
concept as criterion for death (Bernat, 14) together with his own 
observation of the inadequacy of it in certain cases to determine death, has 
adjusted his own position. He seeks certainty by adding to it proper 
consideration of the final end of activity of critically necessary "functions 
of the organism as a whole" (Bernat, 17). This is something of a patchwork 
which leaves open to interpretation the knowledge of the area of the brain 
that may be "critical" to Brain Death (BD). Truog reckons that despite 
common knowledge about and usage of, BD as a basic standard, the 
concept "remains incoherent in theory and confused in practice". He also 
opines that the use of BD as a standard for death should cease. This sense 
of dissatisfaction with a BD standard is noted also by Shewmon on logical 
and physiological grounds (Shewmon, 328). He looks for some other 
standard of increased credibility, based on accurate science. (Ibid., 330). 
Consciousness and its biological basis, necessarily and intimately 
linked in mutuality for life, will be presented as this scientifically based 
requirement. I will refer to this as the mutuality principle. 
There are seven sections following: 
A. Consciousness as a Focus for Life and Death. 
B. Human Person and Personhood. 
C. Integrated and Integrating. 
D. Mutuality of Consciousness and Brain Viability. 
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E. The Problem of the Human Spirit. 
F. Death as Event. 
G. Conclusion: Justice and Love in the Meaning of Life. 
A. Consciousness as a Focus for Life and Death: 
The Important Distinction: Arousal and Awareness: 
Dr. Alex Machado, Ph .D. is credited with clarifying the distinction 
between consciousness as arousal and consciousness as awareness (Garcia, 
32). Arousal is associated with wakefulness and awareness with the content 
of consciousness. Machado asserts that higher-brain advocates in the BD 
literature consider capacity for consciousness (arousal) but use the content 
of consciousness (awareness) to demonstrate this as factual. This is a cause 
for confusion (Machado, 58). Veatch's summation suffers under this 
criticism (Veatch, 24). 
This awareness, or consciousness ' content, stands for the ensemble of 
cognition and affectivity in mind workings. Included in it is the knowing of 
the self-existing, coupled with recognizing and knowing the inner world 
and the outside world (Ibid.). Its loss alone does not signal death (Ibid. 59). 
Machado insists that awareness is preceded by arousal, the first "element" 
of consciousness in the developing human (Ibid.). Basic consciousness as 
arousal , "autonomic-vegetative brain function", is recognized as 
"wakefulness" (Machado, 58). We cannot then be dead until the loss of 
both the awareness and arousal aspects of consciousness. 
This distinction between arousal and awareness should cause us to 
look at such sufferers as Aliheimer' s disease victims, and their families, 
more acutely. A spouse, for instance, would enjoy a relationship having a 
more shared content of consciousness with a sufferer than would others. 
The spouse would also have more to lose in terms of felt relationship. 
Grandchildren, for example, may well have a simpler arousal relationship 
and so would not feel the weakened communication so keenly. Love is 
spiritually communicable in silence. This would be especially true when 
only one person in the dialogue could actually physically speak and be 
heard . Nurses, especially in nursing homes, commonly work on patients' 
arousal level of consciousness using whatever means of communication is 
available to them and which is effective. 
Machado's distinction compels us to reconsider any recognition of 
consciousness with care. It can be disastrous to consider a person dead 
simply because their awareness is lost. When awareness is lost the person 
may be simply in a temporary coma, or a PVS I and alive. It is solely in this 
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P.V. State that arousal and awareness are clearly dissociated (Machado, 
61). The Multi-Society Task Force patently indicates the difference 
between various forms of unconsciousness and actual death considered as 
Brain Death. In brain death proper " none or only reflex spinal movements" 
are detectable (M-S T.F. 1502). 
When a pregnant woman falls into a PVS for example, she can be 
kept on life support to aid the maturation of the fetus even from the "sixth 
to the thirty-fourth week" in the womb. If the woman is truly brain dead, 
however, the use of circulatory-respiratory life support would keep the 
womb viable "for a matter of days, rather than weeks" (Lamb, I 00). 
Brain " Plasticity"is a pertinent difficulty in pinpointing critical brain 
areas of activity. This "plasticity" recognizes that some neurones are 
capable of developing new pathways through the brain. Thus the fact that 
some identifiable areas of the brain are defunct does not necessarily mean 
that consciousness functions are actually lost. Some brain "plasticity" 
found in infants infers that some such " plastic" neuronal activity continues 
in adults in various areas of the brain . Deep brain stimulation in adults 
confirms this. Hence, there is not simply one portion of the brain's 
anatomy able to be isolated which suffices for and necessitates continuation 
of consciousness. However, there are neuronal interactions that do give 
sub service to both consciousness elements (Machado, 60-63). 
There are three observations that flow from Machado' s position. 
I. Consciousness is the most effective means of bodily integration. 
2. Nothing else could act in the effective way consciousness does. 
3. It alone brings together the holistically living organism "when It IS 
possible" which intimates the material potentiality being realized 
(Machado, 64). 
Machado' s definition of death is the irretrievable losing of the two 
"components of consciousness, arousal and awareness"(Machado, 63). It is 
consciousness as content that is first lost as the bodily organism fails . This 
consciousness element provides what is necessary for individual 
recognition and to "enrich personal identity" (Machado, 59). Arousal 
comes earlier in brain development (Ibid.). It fails us last. 
Garcia offers the clearest presentation of the mutuality principle in 
stating that death is "the irreversible loss of consciousness-organism as a 
whole integrated functioning"( I Garcia, 37). This is a median position 
which avoids reductionism from viewing properties that are considered 
specific to humanity. Veatch ' s Higher Brain position, which sees loss of 
higher functions as necessarily including loss of lower functions, is open to 
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reductionism (Veatch, 19). The opposite extreme considers the cessation of 
bodily integrity as the criterion for death. This is slanted towards 
dichotomy (Machado, 57). Garcia nominates a specified "subtotal . but 
critical array of neuronal populations" as necessary for life (I Garcia, 37). 
This ensures a median position and also satisfies the specific concern of 
Veatch for the required philosophical need of an accurate anatomical base ( 
Veatch, 19). 
Garcia supports and expands Machado' s position but takes a more 
rounded view of death. He views death as a "biological-psychosocial-
spiritual phenomenon" (Garcia, 36). A philosophical input on the 
significance of the process of consciousness developing in conjunction 
with the brain is therefore required. Any omission of this Garcia holds as a 
major oversimplification (I Garcia, 32). Just how the arousal aspect of 
consciousness comes into brain development and contributes to the content 
of consciousness needs consideration (Ibid.). 
Veatch's mind/body integration oversimplifies the matter. I would 
think he knew this by asking for it to be further 'discussed (Veatch, 24). I 
posit that the mind is made up, changed and developed by a living person 
who is a body-sou I-spirit integrated, integrating and functioning unitary 
complex. Others point to this. Aquinas' "gift to the world" was his 
insistence in linking together our human intellectual abstraction with 
sensory activity in our knowing system. In this he is somewhat aided by 
Scotus (Suttor, 263). Bonaventure elaborates this by holding that the 
likeness of the object is "engendered" by the external sensory "organ", 
passed to the internal "organ", the brain, and thence to our "apprehending 
faculty" (Bonaventure, 20). We delight in what we know "based on 
proportion" (Ibid.). 
Our knowing system of sense and the spiritual is not in conflict with 
cognitive science. Cognitive science speaks of the exemplar in the external 
world, the stereotype handed down for learning, as for instance the typical 
nurse, and the prototype as formed in the neurological brain (May et ai, 5). 
The spiritual aspect must be included. I will argue for Garcia's expanded 
view of consciousness and death . In sum, consciousness must be 
adequately appreciated and considered and anatomically well grounded. 
However, at this juncture, I will examine the person as concept and 
identity. 
B. Human Person and Personhood: 
Conjectural positions regarding persons and personhood are 
conflicting. (Veatch, 20). The law in the USA discusses whether or not a 
human being is an alive, individualized one. Hence any discussion about 
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"personhood is irrelevant" for that context (Ibid.). However, marked human 
qualities are found in consciousness awareness, not simply arousal. These 
are quite necessary "and enrich his personal identity"(Machado, 59). In 
this perspective "personal identity" precedes its being enriched. I argue for 
"personal identity" from conception. 
Person and Personhood: 
Singer claims "bioethics uses the term, person in a particular fashion. 
'Person' is now often used to mean a being with certain characteristics such 
as rationality and self-awareness" (1 Singer, 180). He has no problem with 
using the term person for animals. He claims that most of the modern 
theories appear derived from Boethius (+524) who offers person as "an 
individual substance of rational nature"(lbid.). Singer follows on from this 
and from Locke who distinguishes the thinking self from the underlying 
biological self (Ibid.). Then, for Singer, there are divine persons, human 
persons, animal persons all simply reduced to persons without regard to 
differences of substance, dignity, importance, ability and right to life 
(l.Singer, 181-183). Such negativity is to reduce all to masks and then 
assert that all masks are the same. It is of interest that he compares a 
healthy baboon with an anencephalic human child. He complains that we 
take organs from the baboon but spare the disabled child as "sacrosanct"(1 
Singer, 183). He does not compare a healthy baboon with a healthy human 
of some maturity. It is as if he simply lets ideas intermingle so as to permit 
drawing conclusions as one wishes, prefers or desires. He asserts that the 
sanctity of life ethic is "at the point of collapse"(2 Singer, 231). Life and 
death are considered as conveniently as you might wish in this approach. 
The concept of person suffers under Singer' s negativity. 
Aquinas (+1274) preferred rational essence to rational nature in 
defining person, to overcome the problems later raised by Singer. Thus, the 
human person did enjoy a special place in nature. In fact the human person 
"means that which is most perfect in the whole of nature" (ST la 29.3). 
The high point of its excelling is possessing "a dominion over its own 
activity"(ST.la.29.1). Scotus (+1308) a generation later, held that the 
person was to be not just recognized but also reverenced by 
" indifference"(De Saint Maurice, 343)? For Scotus this would entail a 
recognition of what a person, human or divine was, so as to hail the self-
possessed person by virtue of substance. Aquinas and Scotus would be in 
concert in their appreciation of a person. 
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The Embryonic Human Person: 
Dianne Irving correlates the human embryo, even from fertilization, 
with the human person (Irving, 26-40). The scientific answer to the identity 
of the human embryo is that it is a human being from the moment of 
fertilization (Irving, 32). There is a clear consistency of opinion regarding 
the commencement of life for each and every human being (Op. Cit. 31). 
Then, too, personhood is based on an actuality. It is not enough to define a 
person simply on feelings or thoughts (Loc.Cit.33). In her view the 
philosophical opinion of a human being as human person needs to be based 
on correct science. Gaita, laudably I think, makes a great deal out of the 
preciousness of each human being (Gaita, 26). To deny this preciousness, 
or worse still, to ignore this in others, is to deny our common humanity. 
Being dismissive of a deep inner life in others does this (lbid.57-59). 
The Question of Fertilization, Death of the Gametes and New Life: 
When it comes to fertilization, one question remains unanswered. 
What happens when the sperm cell breaches and enters the egg cell? The 
resultant should be a cadaveric conglomerate of dead cells and so should be 
dead. The union of two living one-cells, sperm and egg, results in the 
destruction of them both as single cells. Since both have begun to 
disintegrate their deaths are past events. Disintegration of what was living 
follows death (Bernat, 15; Garcia, 31 ; Gert, 24 et al.). Consider a bicycle 
tire punctured. Whether the puncture is small or large is irrelevant to the 
tire ' s loss of air and "death" as a tire. 
Consider, too, the work of the spirit. The spirit of the parent of a 
haploid (N chromosome) cell could not bring back to life what has been 
discharged from its body corporate. The spirit is a communicating power 
and not a life-giving one. It would ensure temporary viability only. The 
spirit's presence would cling to the gametes. This would apply to the male 
manufactured gamete (N) and the ripened female gamete (N) discharged 
into the fallopian tube. 
It might be objected that a nucleus could be extracted from a 
unicellular organism and transferred to another unicellular organism whose 
nucleus had been removed, as in Dolly the sheep (Billings, 17). However, 
the donor spirit kept alive the extracted nucleus, as Dolly' s aging clone 
showed. White ' s experiment illustrates this phenomenon. A monkey's 
head severed from its body in a laboratory setting may continue to show 
signs of consciousness. It is not yet dead (White, et al. 135-9 in Gert, 26). 
This illustrates the presence of a spirit, even an animal spirit, and its 
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integrating activity even to separated parts of the body. It is also possible 
that a new life-giving animal soul is created. It would then be seen to have 
to struggle with an older and inadequate biological body basis from the 
transferred nucleus. 
The human soul, for Scotus, is simply one but with distinctions of a 
formal nature (De Saint-Maurice, 198-200), which are recognized by 
reason, though not separated in substance. Such would be that of soul and 
spirit-of-soul, or simply stated by Aquinas as spirit/soul (Aquinas, ST. la 
79.13). Animal souls are for animals and vegetative souls for plants, but 
these do not answer to eternal justice and love. The created human spiritual 
heart, by its action with the fused gametes, must be one and integrated in 
itself Otherwise, the new life, a human being and person, would lack the 
base for human consciousness as the integrative power needed for human 
development, its self rule and concomitant responsibility. This base 
becomes recognizable in human communicative terms first as simple 
presence, then as consciousness as arousal and then, further developed, as 
awareness. 
New Life: 
We know that the gametes ' contents do live on when there is fusion 
under adequate conditions. The IVF programs show this. There must, 
therefore, be required a power for development, greater than simply a 
communicating spirit. This power would drive the new chemical mixture 
and combine with it to become in an instant an integrated and integrating 
organism, the nascent human being and person. This need would be 
answered by the creation of the personal spiritual heart, or soul, at the 
fusion point by God. This new organism is a new life, an integrated and 
integrating person in action. Already this new life is heading for the 
chromosome exchange that will form the genetic foundation of the new 
diploid (2N chromosome cells). It will be identified by such things as 
personal fingerprints, DNA, and ECG. Should the new life ' s development 
fail it would be from biological insufficiency or human destructive 
intervention. In such cases, death comes early in life. We can only 
commend those souls to God ' s love and care. 
As an alternative view, Ford holds for the traditional ensoulment 
position. The soul would require being created only after the beginning of 
"the human individual". There would not be any "empirical" evidence. It is 
in this action that each of us humans " is formed to be a person" (Ford, 
262). How the process of developing fertilization reaches the individual 
status from dead cellular material before it can become a person is not 
40 Linacre Quarterly 
addressed. That is a huge problem for holding for the ensoulment of a 
posited already living unit. 
It is known that "spontaneous generation cannot take place"(lglesias, 
I 08). This type of generation was incorporated in the thinking of Aristotle 
and Aquinas, with their limited science. Their thinking is somewhat 
responsible for the traditional notion of ensoulment. They used souls 
changing into different types of souls to overcome their difficulties (Ibid.). 
Scotus' view of the human soul as "unique and simple" eliminates this 
plurality of souls in the human being (De Saint-Maurice, 198). A different 
look at the moment of fertilization would, as I have outlined, be more 
productive. 
C. Integrated and Integrating Function: Machado's Proposal: 
Machado' s insight is that consciousness is responsible for our being 
both integrated and integrative "when it is possible,"(Machado, 64). It 
becomes possible when the gametes fuse and the soul is created. It remains 
possible while anatomically and physiologically able. The specification of 
the spiritual heart as the seat of consciousness as a philosophical necessity 
would chime in with Machado' s conviction. The soul operates in union 
with the developing body and itself matures. Philosophically, the soul 
supplies Garcia with the underpinning for the soullbrain development and 
concomitant development of consciousness, both arousal and awareness3 
(I Garcia, 32). Garcia has asked this of philosophy (lbid.).Garcia implies 
that the process begins before the brain formation , which would be from 
conception. Thus the integrated and integrating spiritual heart supplies the 
power for the integrated and integrating organism to live as a unit. 
Opposite Views: 
As an alternative viewpoint, the term evolution is produced. This is 
theoretical speculation about some mysterious power to fill a gap in the 
productive sequence, which somehow gives new life from dead matter. It 
can also be used to cover any possibility of how things change. This is truly 
a genuine missing link. Nature abhors a vacuum so it is said. 
However, quite to the contrary of this opposite view, the creation of 
spirit life requires a creator even for flora and fauna. It is more needed for 
the human person. Without the created spiritual soul there is no substantive 
power to bring about the development of the unitary human being, nor to 
instigate and drive the integration of the body as consciousness producing. 
The soul, as integral in its own spiritual reality, supplies the power, as the 
seat of consciousness, for the unitary development of the human person. 
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Then again, Lockwood takes a different position. He holds that human 
identity is dependent on the human brain so that the beginning and end of 
all human persons" lives are determined by the brain (Lockwood, 45). 
How can the brain form the brain to become the necessary substratum of 
human life? Any such position requires some materialistic action to form 
the brain so that the brain may sustain the living whole. He seems to 
dismiss spiritual ity as nonexistent. Lockwood speaks of "brain life". At the 
same time he would forbid an embryo or fetus, having been subjected to 
experiment and been irreversibly damaged, to be allowed to develop 
further. He would abhor a deformed psychological development (Ibid.). 
Ford finds that Lockwood considers that existence begins in the span 
between "conception and birth" (Ford, 157). I prefer the spiritual soul as 
the reasoned substratum for life given and ongoing. 
These alternative concepts of Persons, as espoused by Lockwood, in 
lieu of having a created soul, or by Singer and others basing personal 
identity on psychological grounds are not very attractive. A dying person 
may lose their sense of identity and yet remain alive (Lamb, 93). If death 
should be decided by simple psychological observation of the loss of 
personhood, understood psychologically, a living unconscious human being 
such as a PVS person would be condemned (Ibid .). I reject them as unreal. 
Singer' s position is a case in point. "The person rather than the body" 
is what we ought to care about (2 Singer, 236). From the Bland case, where 
arousal had not been lost, Singer concludes that loss of consciousness, as in 
Bland' s case, gives sufficient grounds for doctors to terminate the patient's 
life as being of "no benefit to her" (lbid.,242) . Singer now seems content 
to rely on the Law Lords of Britain to bolster his notion of "person" in 
bioethics. He sees brain death as a "convenient fiction"(lbid. , 235), which 
is no longer needed. However, the issue of whether or not bioethics is an 
integral part of ongoing life in our social daily living arises. People do not 
lead a laboratory day-by-day existence as an excised bioethics might well 
suggest. Nor are we simply a mixture of biology and biologically suitable 
ethics. 
In sum, the spirit-soul as integral itself and having the power to 
integrate the body, provides a seat for consciousness that is rational, 
volitional and communicative for the development of the "biological-
psychosocial-spiritual" person that Garcia sees us to be (Garcia, 36). 
D. Mutuality of Consciousness and Brain Viability: 
The conception of the human person as a unitary organism allows us 
to consider death as a "biological-psychosocial-spiritual phenomenon" 
(Ibid.). Along with this Garcia formulates a "consciousness-body as a 
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whole critical system" as a reliable base, which is rational as well, for the 
development of the unitary concept of person (Ibid.). This uses the same 
sense of mutuality as do Veatch and Machado. Garcia would build on 
Machado's acceptance of death as the irreversible loss of consciousness, 
both arousal and awareness, by linking this to the organism as a whole and 
finding a common neurological basis that supports this (Garcia, 36-37). I 
believe Veatch would find this acceptable. Garcia holds for the person as a 
whole concept rather than the body as a whole, which latter he sees as 
"unilateral" and insufficient (Garcia, 36). So do I. 
The process by which the brain is brought to arousal needs to be 
reckoned. This includes an appropriate appraisal of its contribution to the 
content of consciousness. This has "philosophical significance"(Garcia, 
32). I am proposing that the spiritual heart, or soul, created at conception 
will answer this concern. As the embryo grows it is integrated and 
integrating as a consciousness-body organism. Soul and chemical materials 
are im-mediately fusing into one. Physiological growth flowers into the 
anatomical brain and consciousness is developed. It further matures. 
Consciousness is not limited to humanity, and Gert illustrates its 
power (Gert, 27). A monkey' S head severed from its body in a laboratory 
setting, may continue to show signs of consciousness. It is not yet dead 
(White, et al. 135-9 in Gert, 26). This illustrates the integral unity of a 
spirit, even an animal spirit. 
Hence, loss of all consciousness, even that in any part separated from 
the body, and permanent cessation of functioning as a whole must precede 
a recognition of death (Gert, 25). Thus is mutuality destroyed. 
E. Tbe Problem of tbe Human Spirit: Concerning tbe Biological-
Psycbosocial -Spiritual Development of tbe Human Person Followed 
by Deatb: 
Our Spiritual Transcendence and Interactions: 
It is possible to see the human person as individuated from the 
community. This contrasts with the rugged individualism that individuality, 
when over-stressed, can often promote (Habermas, 130-131). We suffer no 
loss of identity when we mix spiritually. We are invited to accept that the 
soul has a communicative capacity for other spirits. A capacity that resides 
in the soul and yet is formally distinct from it.4 
This is the transcendence of everyday life, which makes us to go 
outside our own selves and whatever is the object of our immediate 
concern, which is our everyday knowing and desiring. It is unavoidable 
(Rahner, 14). Some people are afraid of this natural phenomenon, and fight 
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it instead of appreciating it. It has a parallel with our long sight and short 
sight. If we govern our focus, both long and short sight serve us well. If we 
accept and appreciate our spiritual communication with our fellow humans, 
it too, serves us well. 
Rahner identifies something important about the human spirit in its 
"unlimited extent...in knowledge and freedom". This comes to us 
unavoidably from the themes of life which are our day by day experiences 
(Rahner, 15). In the interplay of humanity the spirit-soul is automatically 
activated by others and activates them. I am in the world and of it though I 
am spirit, could be said by each of us. We are engaged by the universal 
creation in an "essential relationship" (Puntel, 1619-20). Unless we miss 
the obvious we "attend to Being Itself' (Bonaventure, 44-45). 
God is not at some infinite distance as filling in the gaps of life ' s 
difficulties but, rather, radically close (Rahner, 1 5). God " is that which 
directly comprises the attainable goal" (Ibid.).5 The human person thus 
appears as someone self-responsible, self-determining, learning to live and 
love in a community of fellows and yet answerable to God and humanity. 
We are spiritually linked and this linkage is not totally destroyed by death. 
God is the common spiritual ancestor as Creator though of the uncreated 
order. 
Mind and Spirit: The mind, which some people simply equate with 
the spirit, can be seen to be made up using our body-sou I-spirit cooperative 
complexities. We communicate not only with words and body language but 
with the subtleties of our spirits. The spiritual factor, especially involving 
the "human psychosocial and spiritual dimensions" that Garcia specifies is 
quite relevant. Death has a definite spiritual relevance. Sensitive spirits, not 
all medical people, are often helped to recognize death by subtle spiritual 
change (President's Commission, 177). 
Death shows the human person passing away from the physical world. 
We suffer a break in bodily life (Garcia, 31). The soul, as our responsible 
self, will need to survive death as will be seen. 
F. Deatb as Event: 
Death is the demarcation between the "process of dying and .. . 
disintegration"(Garcia, 3 7). In our beginnings the soul was able to form 
with the body an integrated and integrating organism, while this was 
possible. When the mutuality principle within the organism is totally 
negated, inside and outside the brain, then there is death (2 Garcia, 40). 
At death, the unity of soul and body is destroyed . There remains only 
the withdrawal of the presence of the spirit. The sequence would be the 
opposite of the beginning. Thus, firstly awareness is lost, then arousal is 
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lost. The sundering of the integrated and integrating organism is complete. 
In relation to our living and dying, as people pass away from loss of both 
consciousness elements, the spirit lingers as if reluctant to leave. This 
phenomenon carries into a funeral where farewells are taken. 
The withdrawal of a lingering presence of the spirit takes some time. 
This is further illustrated by the pregnant woman whose body is brain dead 
as distinct from the one in a vegetative state. Being brain dead she was 
able, on circulatory-respiratory support, to nurture the child in the organ 
that is the womb for a matter of days, but not weeks, whereas a PVS mother 
could nurture to term. (Lamb, 100). 
G. Conclusion: Justice and Love in the Meaning of Life: 
Emanuel suggests to us that the wonder of life and its mysterious 
ending better describes death (Emanuel, 56). This is certainly worth 
remembering. The unitary spirit-sou I-body description would enshrine both 
justice and love. I would say that the soul would require immortality 
because of these functions . Without immortality justice would be hollow, 
and, without eternal life, any higher or deeper love would be an illusion. 
The passing away in death for the wise souls, learned in being loved and 
themselves loving in return, would be filled with hope (Gert, 25). Even the 
ancient pagan philosopher Aristotle was a man of hope and he held onto 
hope even through death. He was a community-oriented person and 
encouraged others to hope as well. In his will he ordered his executors to 
"set up in Stagira statues of life-size to Zeus and Athena, the Saviors" 
(Ross, W.O., vi). 
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